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The Patent Monopoly Versus Antitrust
Activism: Open Warfare
or Armed Truce?
by WILLIAM J. KEATING*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "monopoly" has acquired an odious connotation to
the extent that it is seldom recognized that all of us exercise mo-
nopolies continually in our daily lives. Our control over our prop-
erty, personal and real, to the extent that we preclude others from
interfering with our quiet enjoyment of the property, is so in-
grained in the philosophy of our social system as not to be subject
to serious questioning. Students of the antitrust jurisprudence
might be appalled at the suggestion that such quiet enjoyment of
property constitutes a monopoly.
Limited monopolies sanctioned by law for a valid purpose are
not unknown. Airline routes, telephone lines, electrical power dis-
tribution utilities, motor freight carriers, television channels, and
many other enterprises are granted monopolies along geographical
or functional boundaries. These legal monopolies are based on the
realization that it would be impractical and economically unsound
if, for example, two or more power distribution companies com-
peted with each other for the same customers. No one would com-
mit the necessary financial investment in generators, power lines
* B.S. 1947, Canisius College; J.D. 1954, Georgetown University;
Patent Counsel for AMP Incorporated, Harrisburg, Pa.; Adjunct Associate
Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, Pa.
and other equipment to provide electrical service, unless assured
that he would be guaranteed a sufficient number of customers to
justify a reasonable return on the investment.
These legal monopolies are usually granted after administra-
tive hearings' where anyone opposing such grants may present his
views on the record. A hearing examiner conducts the proceedings
and cross examination so that inter partes representation and ap-
pellate review are preserved. The grant is made when considera-
tion of the evidence leads to the conclusion that it would be in the
best interest of the public to do so.2
A quasi-monopolistic practice occurs in granting patents to in-
ventors. The United States Patent Office issues patents under the
patent law to inventors who qualify.3 The Patent Office has the
plural functions of issuing patents to the inventors who are enti-
tled to patents, protecting the public by refusing to issue patents
in situations where the inventor is not entitled to a patent,4 and
acting as judge to determine which is which.5 This determination
is made without the benefit of an inter partes procedure.
These proceedings have inspired antitrust activists to attack
the patent system as spawning illegal monopolies at the expense of
free enterprise. Defenders of the patent system direct attention
to the fact that the patent statutes have the blessing of the Consti-
tution,6 whereas the antitrust laws are merely implied in the com-
merce clause and generated on a case by case basis.7 Rather than
opt for repeal of the patent system, opponents have been chipping
away at the use and procurement of patents on the basis that they
are and should be subservient to an overriding policy of free enter-
prise. To establish perspective, a brief look at the patent grant is
in order.
A. The Patent
The patent statute provides that an inventor who wishes to
secure a patent must file an application describing the best mode
of carrying out his invention as well as one or more claims identi-
1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-75, 701-06, 3105,
3344, 7521 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission Act, 47 U.S.C. §§
151-55 (1962).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1954).
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1954).
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 134 (1954).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8 provides in part: The Congress shall
have power . . .
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.
7. The basic antitrust acts include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7; The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44; The Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13a, 13b, 13c and 21a; and The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 44-57.
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fying his contribution.8 When an application for a patent is filed,
it is assigned to a patent examiner who is scientifically trained and
experienced in the art to which the invention pertains. In order
to warrant a patent, the invention must be new,9 useful,10 and con-
stitute an advance representing something more than the ordinary
skill of the artisan.'1 In so scrutinizing the patent application the
patent examiner has available to him a well classified set of United
States patents pertaining to the art comprising the invention as
well as a less complete set of foreign patents. The examiner re-
views the state of the art and, if the invention meets the qualifica-
tions, issues the patent.12 If it does not meet the qualifications, he
refuses to issue the patent.' 3 The applicant has a right of appeal,
first to the Board of Appeals in the Patent Office and ultimately
to the courts.'
4
If the patent is issued, the aforementioned qualifications con-
stitute the metes and bounds of the inventor's monopoly.'5 To
this extent, the patent law is somewhat self-compensating. If the
invention is of little or no importance, then granting an exclusive
monopoly does not deprive the public of anything worthwhile. On
the other hand, if the invention is of great significance, then the
inventor's grant is of comparable value.
B. The Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws are comprised of a series of laws passed by
Congress under its authority to regulate interstate commerce. The
Sherman Act,16 passed in 1880 is the oldest and broadest of the
antitrust laws. Basically, it prohibits monopolies or attempts to
monopolize as well as conspiracies in restraint of trade. Congress
made no effort to define every monopolistic act which was con-
demned but left it to the courts to develop the law on a case by
case basis. The Clayton Act 17 was promulgated in 1914 as an ad-
junct to the Sherman Act and prohibited certain mergers as well
as exclusive dealing arrangements having a tendency to restrain
trade. The third area of trust enforcement lies in Section 5 of
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1954).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1954).
10. Id.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1954).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1954).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1954).
14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 134, 141-45 (1954).
15. 35 U.SC. § 112 (1954).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1971).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1971).
the Federal Trade Commission Act' s which condemns unfair prac-
tices.
Violation of the Sherman or Clayton Acts might invite atten-
tion from the Justice Department or provide a basis for private
suit, but the FTC has exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the
FTC Act. Ordinarily the FTC will not punish past conduct but
will issue cease and desist orders prohibiting future acts. The
question arises, to what extent do acts committed through man-
agement of patents constitute violations of the antitrust laws; or
restated, where does the monopoly granted by the patent act end,
and the monopoly prohibited by the antitrust laws begin? With
this background, let us examine some of the patent practices which
antitrust activists consider suspect.
II. RESTRicTED ACTIVITIES
There is no disagreement that price fixing, bid rigging, cartels
and other predatory, per se violations, are not purified by the pres-
ence of patents.19 Activities outside the patent grant are judged
by normal antitrust standards. There is no conflict between the
antitrust laws and the patent laws in these areas because the patent
laws are not applicable. Cases arising in this sphere peripherally
involve patents because an antitrust violator may endeavor to use
patents in an attempt to justify an otherwise illegal act. The
courts have uniformly declined to sanction such a defense. The
major areas where antitrust and patent laws overlap include patent
procurement, patent usage, and patent licensing.
A. Patent Procurement
As discussed above, the procurement of a patent is an ex parte
proceeding between the inventor and the Patent Office. In the
United States system, there is no opportunity for the general pub-
lic or interested third parties to oppose the granting of a patent.2 0
If a patent is issued, the only effective way of invalidating it is to
ignore it, invite a suit for patent infringement and then defend on
the ground that the patent was issued improperly through inad-
vertence or mistake on the part of the Patent Office. The proceed-
ing is expensive, time consuming and risky.
In view of the ex parte nature of the Patent Office proceed-
ings the courts have long held that the inventor, through his attor-
ney, has the duty of exercising a high degree of candor in dealing
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1971).
19. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
20. Most foreign countries have opposition proceedings which pro-
vide the opportunity for any interested member of the public to op-
pose the granting of the patent. Such a proceeding has been proposed
as part of the Patent Reform Act.
Under the doctrine of Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434
(1871), only the United States Congress may annul or set aside a patent
grant.
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with the Patent Office. The attorney has the ethical standards im-
posed on any member of the bar. In an ex parte proceeding the
standards are compounded. The spectrum of conduct may be cate-
gorized in four areas: acts of complete omission, acts of selective
omission, acts of commision, and acts of fraud.
1. Complete Omission
As explained, the inventor is entitled to a patent only if the
invention is new, useful, and advances the state of the art. Assume
the inventor (or his attorney) is aware of an obscure patent pre-
viously issued in Finland, that discloses a similar invention. Also
assume it is probable that the patent examiner is not aware of the
Finnish patent and that if he were aware of it, he would be less
likely to grant the United States patent, since the advance of the
state of the art (as represented by the Finnish patent) may not be
sufficient to justify the issuance of another patent. Does the at-
torney have a duty to disclose the existence of the patent to the
Patent Office? The situation is somewhat similar to an attorney
involved in litigation who is aware of a decided case adverse to
his position when the court and his adversary are unaware of the
case. Does he have a duty to direct the court's attention to the
case? While candor is required, does it extend to assisting your
opponent in finding information freely available to him, to your
detriment?
The present state of the law does not require that the appli-
cant's attorney call to the attention of the Patent Office any prior
art which he considers nonanticipatory. 2 1 Of course, if the infor-
mation is only available to him, then the duty of candor becomes
greater. However he must not deliberately misrepresent the status
of the prior art.22 Furthermore, the applicant must file an oath
with the patent application to the effect that he believes himself
to be the first inventor of the device for which he solicits a pat-
ent. 23 Obviously, if he or his attorney knows of prior art antici-
pating the invention, he cannot in good conscience execute such an
oath.
There is a greater duty on the part of the applicant to disclose
to the Patent Office factual matters within the particular knowl-
edge of the applicant which may have a bearing on the issue of
21. RPTZ - PATCO Inc. v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 253 F.
Supp. 796 (D. Ore. 1966).
22. Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 241 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.
Ill. 1964).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1954).
whether he is entitled to a patent. In Beckman Instruments v.
Chemtronics Inc.,24 plaintiff had filed a patent application on a de-
vice for determining the concentration of oxygen in liquid or gases.
Unknown to the Patent Office, but known to Beckman, a Dr.
Stowe had previously invented the same type of device for deter-
mining carbon dioxide content in blood samples. Dr. Stowe's de-
vice was never patented but was dedicated to the public through
disclosure in a public speech and published article. Since the Pat-
ent Office was unaware of Dr. Stowe's work they issued the patent
to Beckman. Chemtronics manufactured a device for sensing the
amount of oxygen inside an aviator's mask, which infringed the
cpatent. During the course of the trial the court was apprised of
Dr. Stowe's work and Beckman's failure to bring it to the attention
of the Patent Office during the prosecution of the patent applica-
tion. The court held the patent invalid and excoriated Beckman
for failing to divulge to the Patent Office the Stowe device. 25
Since the Patent Office does not have full research facilities of
its own and since there is no opportunity for inter partes proceed-
ings where interested third parties might present evidence mili-
tating against the grant of the patent, the courts have held that
the patent applicant has an uncompromising duty of disclosure as
well as absolute honesty and good faith, citing Precision Instru-
ment Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machine Co. 26
Although no one can quarrel with the requirement of honesty
and good faith, the patent practitioner is faced with the dilemma
of how far to go in bringing matters to the attention of the Patent
Office. In the Beckman case, there was no privity between Stowe
and Beckman. The attorneys for Beckman asserted that in their
judgment, the Stowe device was no more pertinent than prior art
cited by the Patent Office. Regardless of care and candor, a vigor-
ously litigated case will bring out facts that a skillful adversary
can use as a basis for imputing misconduct.
The difficulty in requiring an inventor to advise the Patent
Office of known pertinent patents is in determining the limits of
that advice. If he has a duty to cite the Finnish patent, does he
also have a duty to cite all pertinent foreign patents or even all
pertinent United States patents? Such a requirement would mean
that at some point the burden had shifted so that the inventor was
doing the Patent Office's work.
As a practical matter, it is to the inventor's advantage to ap-
prise the Patent Office of the best known prior art. The patent
carries a presumption of validity. 27 However, the presumption
only applies with regard to prior art considered by the Patent Of-
24. 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 566.
26. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1954).
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fice during the prosecution and made of record in the patent file
history.28 If the best prior art is not cited, the patent may be de-
clared invalid in litigation. The inventor strengthens his patent
by citing the best prior art to the Patent Office. However, the
question under consideration is whether he has a duty to cite
such art and the consequences for failure to do so.
2. Selective Omission
As Mark Twain said, there are three types of lies: lies,
damned lies and statistics. The inventor by selectively omitting
negative information can mislead the Patent Office possibly to the
extent of its issuing a patent that would not have been issued if
all facts were known to them.
For example, assume the invention of a new pharmaceutical
designed to reduce the cholesterol level in human beings. A pat-
ent application is filed including data demonstrating that when the
drug was administered under controlled conditions to a specified
number of human beings, there was a significant reduction in the
cholesterol level. Based on this data the Patent Office would
probably be persuaded to grant the patent. However, if complete
data indicated that this reduction only occurrred in 10% of the pa-
tients treated, the Patent Office might conclude that the drug was
not effective for the purposes indicated and deny the patent. The
thought of withholding data in a situation involving treatment of a
disease appears unconscionable. However, the question still looms
as to how much information must be presented. During any de-
velopment project there is a high probability of generating nega-
tive data, especially in the early stages. There is some danger
that presentation of all data might involve reams and reams of test
results that would be misleading in the opposite direction, or at
best, be useless.
29
Another less dramatic variation of the same theme is selec-
tively presenting prior art to the Patent Office. Again, alluding to
the previous example, suppose the inventor's attorney submits to
the Patent Office, citations of prior art known to him, and fails to
identify prior art known to him that later is discovered and con-
sidered the most pertinent prior art. Is he guilty of misleading the
Patent Office through selective omission? Difficulty arises in that
28. A.R. Inc. v. Electro-Voice Inc., 311 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1962);
Hobbs v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 250 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1957).
29. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096
(5th Cir. 1972).
the best prior art is a matter of individual judgment on which rea-
sonable men may differ. To say that the attorney exercised poor
judgment is one thing, but to say that he misled the Patent Office
by selective omission is an even graver charge.
3. Commission
Acts of commission involve filing affirmative statements, affi-
davits, or other evidence to persuade the Patent Office to issue a
patent. Acts of commission are easier to identify and presume
truthfulness and candor. A recent case30 illustrating the point in-
volves the tetracycline cases. The Charles Pfizer Company filed a
patent application on an antibiotic drug identified as tetracycline.
There was no doubt of its efficacy and usefulness. The process for
manufacturing tetracycline was similar to the process for manu-
facturing aureomycin, which was previously known and patented.3 1
The patent examiner questioned whether tetracycline was in fact
a by-product of aureomycin. If so, tetracycline would not have
been considered "new" within the meaning of the term in patent
parlance, and thus not entitled to a patent.
The inventor's attorney submitted an affidavit from an officer
of Pfizer, stating under oath that they had conducted tests on the
broth produced in the process for the manufacture of aureomycin
and that tetracycline was not present. After lengthy proceedings
in the Patent Office a patent issued. 2 Subsequently, the Federal
Trade Commission brought an action to compel Pfizer to license
the patent in view of misrepresentations made to the Patent Office.
The compound was not new because tetracycline was in fact pres-
ent in the aureomycin broth as indicated by data in Pfizer's pos-
ession. Pfizer took the position that although it was present, the
quantities were so small as to be negligible. The hearing examiner
found for Pfizer on the grounds that only a significant co-produc-
tion of tetracycline would bar issuance of a patent. However, on
appeal, the Commission reversed. An appeal was taken to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination of
whether the representation by Pfizer misled the patent examiner. 38
The patent examiner was called as a witness and tesitifed that
if he had been aware of the fact that tetracycline was present in
the aureomycin broth, he would not have issued the patent. A de-
cision was rendered against Pfizer and was upheld on appeal.3 4
30. Charles Pfizer Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574 (6th
Cir. 1968).
31. U.S. Patent No. 2,482,055.
32. U.S. Patent No. 2,699,054.
33. Charles Pfizer Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574, 577
(6th Cir. 1968).
34. Id.
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Further, the courts have consistently held that affirmative state-
ments made to the Patent Office must be candid and forthright.
3 5
4. Fraud
There is no doubt that the making of statements or affidavits
to the Patent Office which are false, known to the affiant to be a
false, constitutes a reprehensible practice that taints the issued
patent and subjects the affiant to disciplinary action.
Hazel Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co.80 is probably the leading case
on point. The invention involved a glass making machine and a
patent application was filed.; The Patent Office was not con-
vinced that the invention advanced the state of the art. To per-
suade the Patent Office of the advance of the art represented by
the machine, the patent attorney prosecuting the case filed a copy
of what purported to be an article written by a labor leader.3 7 The
article described the machine as a remarkable advance in the art
and predicted that the machine was so efficient that it would cause
a great deal of unemployment in the glass making industry if
adopted.38 Ultimately the patent became involved in suit and the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed
the complaint.3 9 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
quoting copiously from the article.
40
The article, in fact, was spurious, having been written for the
sole purpose of persuading the Patent Office to issue the patent.
When this was discovered, the court not only voided the patent but




A pocket of law has grown up as a defense in patent cases
which seems to say that a patent improperly acquired constitutes
35. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mainte-
nance Mach., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1944).
36. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
37. Id. at 240-41.
38. Id.
39. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel Atlas Co., 39 F.2d 111, 120 (W.D.
Pa. 1930). The district court held the patent invalid as a result of
other defenses that did not involve the article.
40. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel Atlas Co., 59 F.2d 399, 403, 404
(3d Cir. 1932).
41. Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 241 (1944). The Su-
preme Court review of disbarment proceedings is found in Kingsland
v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
an illegal monopoly and therefore, runs afoul of the antitrust laws.
Probably the leading case, because it was recently decided by the
Supreme Court, is Walker, Inc. v. Food Machinery.
42
Food Machinery (FMC) sued Walker Process for patent in-
fringement of its patent covering certain sewage treatment equip-
ment. Walker counterclaimed on the ground that the patent was
invalid. It was discovered that FMC had sold devices covered by
the patent more than one year prior to the filing of its patent ap-
plication, contrary to the patent statute and contrary to an oath
filed in the Patent Office as part of its patent application. FMC
moved to dismiss and Walker amended its counterclaim to charge
an antitrust violation on the grounds that FMC had illegally mo-
nopolized interstate commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith
obtaining and maintaining its patent and filing a false oath in the
Patent Office. The District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois dismissed the counterclaim on the basis of failure of a cause
of action and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
43
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that such an action
would lie under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 4 It held, however,
that it was not a per se violation. In order to prove the antitrust
counterclaim, Walker would have to prove that the devices cov-
ered by the patent constituted a relevant market and that the ille-
gally acquired patent lessened or destroyed competition in the
relevant market.4' The case was sent back to the district court for
trial on these issues. Mr. Justice Harlan separately concurred to
emphasize that a claim for an antitrust violation would lie only if
actual fraud were proven, and that patents invalidated for "obvi-
ousness" or other technical reasons would not support an antitrust
claim. Also according to Mr. Justice Harlan, good faith on the
part of the patent owner was a complete defense. 46 However, there
is a distinction between a course of conduct on the part of the pat-
entee that supports an antitrust claim and a course of conduct
that renders the patent unenforceable. As discussed above, fraud
in the procurement of the patent plus the lessening of competition
in a relevant market are the elements of an antitrust claim. If
proven, the injured party has a basis for recovering treble damages
under the Sherman Act.
Every patent suit is equitable in nature and therefore subject
to the requirement that the patentee enter the court with clean
hands. 47 Acts of the patentee consituting fraud, or misleading the
Patent Office into granting a patent, either through the acts of com-
42. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
43. 335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1964).
44. Walker, Inc. v. Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 179-80.
47. See note 35 supra.
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mission or selective omission may be a basis for denying the pat-
entee relief. Acts of omission will be a basis for denying relief if
it can be shown that the patentee had a duty to disclose the
omitted information, or if he were aware that the Patent Office
was in fact being misled by his failure to supply information.
48
The Patent Office is presently going through some soul-search-
ing regarding the practice of requiring the patentee to supply a list
of all the best known prior art and file an affidavit to the effect
that the patentee knows of no information which, if presented to
the Patent Office, would be contrary to information furnished in
the patent specification or during the prosecution of the application.
As discussed above, it would place a very heavy burden on the
patentee to preclude the charge of fraud.
B. Patent Usage
If one acquires a patent improperly but never attempts to en-
force it or threatens enforcement, the risk of running afoul of anti-
trust laws is minimal. However, if the owner of an improperly
procured patent brings suit for infringement, the defense of misuse
of patent is sure to arise. Further, if the patentee notifies the trade
that a certain device infringes his patent, knowing full well that it
does not infringe, he is improperly using his patent and subjecting
himself to a declaratory judgment suit. Using the patent as a basis
for price fixing, division of markets, or other proscribed activities
is equally reprehensible and the presence of the patent vdll not
constitute a defense against a charge of violating the antitrust
law.
C. Patent Licensing
One of the methods of exploiting a patent involves licensing
others to use the invention. Whereas the variations in licensing
arrangements are virtually infinite, the common thread running
through all of them is that the patent owner permit the licensee
to operate under the patent grant in exchange for consideration,
usually a sum of money, known as a royalty. The arrangement, of
necessity, involves at least two entities, usually in the same indus-
try, sharing a monopoly to the exclusion of others in the industry.
The situation is rife with antitrust consequences. One of the most
serious dangers of such a situation is the temptation to use a legiti-
mate vehicle, such as a patent license, to mask otherwise illegal
48. Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F.2d 66 (1972).
activity such as division of markets. Another apparent danger
lies in a license that gives the appearance of an illegal motive.49
The licensing of a patent in exchange for a royalty is a per-
fectly legitimate practice. The difficulty arises when additional
restrictions, or promises, express or implied are added to the
agreement. When such restrictions tend to give the parties a com-
petitive advantage otherwise contrary to the antitrust laws and
not within the intended scope of the patent monopoly, the agree-
ment becomes suspect. Let us examine some of the classicial re-
strictions and the result when subjected to antitrust scrutiny.
1. Cross Licenses
Occasionally, the consideration flowing from the patent license
will be a reciprocal license under another patent held by the li-
censee. This simple exchange of licenses is known as a cross li-
cense. It may be that the one inventor holds the basic patent to an
invention while the second inventor owns a patent on a significant
improvement. Neither can exploit the technology without a li-
cense from the other. The solution is an exchange of licenses.
Such an exchange presents no antitrust problems. However, add a
restrictive clause whereby either party promises not to license a
third party without the consent of the other, the relationship
takes on the elements of a conspiracy by two competitors who com-
bine to seal off the market in a manner not contemplated by the
patent laws and contrary to the antitrust laws. The restrictive
covenant has added serious antitrust implications to an otherwise
valid agreement.
2. Price Restrictions
Again assume a patent license with a royalty provision con-
taining a clause to the effect that the licensee agrees not to sell the
product below a specified minimum price. Such an agreement has
been condemned by the Supreme Court. 0 Although the right of a
patentee to require a distributor to support minimum pricing was
condoned by the Supreme Court in United States v. General Elec-
tric1 subsequent cases have narrowed the decision's effect to the




The so-called patent pool is, in effect, a number of common
49. For an excellent review of patent license restrictions, see, Pat-
ents and Anti-trust, 13 PAT. T.M. & Copy. J. 94 (1969).
50. United States v. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
51. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D.
Mich.), aff'd, 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
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cross licenses by all the members of an industry. Usually this ar-
rangement is accomplished through a trade association. The Fed-
eral Government recently indicted the Manufacturers Aircraft
Association and all of its members, representing twenty of the
largest aircraft manufacturers in the United States for conspiracy
to monopolize, as well as for illegal monopoly. The thrust of the
complaint is that since 1928, the members of the Association have
banded together and agreed to pool their patents for the joint bene-
fit of the members.5
3
An agreement between competitors to exclude other competi-
tors by cross licensing patents was condemned by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co. 54 Singer
had filed a United States patent application on a sewing machine
with a dial for automatically adjusting the machine to perform
zigzag sewing.5 5 An Italian company named Vigorelli and a Swiss
company named Gegauf also had patent applications on file.56
Ordinarily in such a situation the Patent Office will declare an ad-
ministrative trial known as an interference proceeding to determine
which applicant was first in point of time to make the invention.5 7
Singer was concerned about importation of Japanese sewing ma-
chines into the United States and sought to have the patent
awarded to it to forestall Japanese competition. It persuaded the
other companies to enter an agreement whereby Singer would own
the patent and the other companies would have a royalty free li-
cense55 This agreement was effected and Singer brought proceed-
ings under the United States Tariff Commission Act 59 to prohibit
importation of Japanese machines alleged to infinge this patent,
whereupon the Justice Department brought suit against Singer
charging a violation of the Sherman Act. The District Court for
the Southern District of New York dismissed the suit6" and the
case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court under Section 2
of the Expediting Act.6 1 The Supreme Court held that the entire
agreement was an attempt by the parties to exclude Japanese
competition. Specifically, the Court found that the agreement
53. Suit is currently pending in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
54. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
55. Id. at 177-78.
56. Id. at 178.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1954).
58. 374 U.S. 174, 178 (1962).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1954).
60. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1952).
amounted to a conspiracy by Singer, Gegauf and Vigorelli to ex-
clude Japanese competition by use of the patent.
62
Reviewing the facts and the decision, it is difficult to perceive
any illegal activity by Singer. They were entitled to enter a cross
license agreement with Gegauf and Vigorelli. They were also en-
titled to protect themselves against Japanese competition. The
fact that Gegauf and Vigorelli were also protected against Jap-
anese competitors is a mere by-product that should not have ren-
dered the agreement illegal.
Mr. Justice White separately concurred on the ground that the
agreement avoiding an interference was illegal because the inter-
ference might have brought out facts that would have resulted in
a patent not being issued to any of the parties.6 3 The concurring
opinion ignores the premise that there is no duty to engage in an
interference contest and, in fact, most interferences are settled.
Whether the interference would have resulted in no patent issuing
was pure speculation. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion
concluding that the Supreme Court was really reversing the dis-
trict court on findings of fact while disguising its ruling as conclu-
sions of law.
64
The significance of the case is that it demonstrates the Su-
preme Court's hostile attitude toward patents. The Court held that
since Singer's protection against patent infringement also inured
to the benefit of Swiss and Italian companies, it was illegal under
the Sherman Act. The Court cited no authority for this proposition
and it is in fact, contrary to well established principles of patent
licensing.65
Patent pools per se are not illegal. It is only when the mutual
cross licensing includes additional agreements having an anti-
competitive effect (e.g. a covenant, express or implied, not to li-
cense others), that the agreement flouts the antitrust laws. Such
activity by the members of the consortium amounts to an agree-
ment by a group of competitors to use their patent position to lock
out future competition. The whole is not always equal to the sum
of the parts.66
4. Tying Agreements
These agreements, usually involve a patented process or ma-
chine where the material used in the process or machine is un-
62. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 188 (1963).
63. Id. at 197-201.
64. Id. at 201.
65. Rule 262 of Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office
gives either party to an interference the right to terminate at any
time.
66. See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th
Cir. 1952).
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patented. It has been uniformly held that conditioning the license
of the patented process or sale of a patented machine on the pur-
chase of unpatented material from the patent holder, is a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. One of the leading cases, Morton Salt
Co. v. Suppiger Co., 67 involved a patented machine for feeding salt
tablets to canned, processed food during the packing process. The
patented machine was an adjunct to the canning line and deposited
a salt tablet in each open can of food as it passed along a conveyor
belt prior to being sealed. The salt tablets were not patentable
and were available from numerous sources.
The Morton Salt Company leased the patented machines and
granted a license under the patent on the express condition that
only salt tablets sold by Morton Salt would be used in the ma-
chine. The Court held that this was a violation of antitrust law
since the patent owner was using his patent to control the sales
of an unpatented item.68
5. Block Licenses
Owners of a large portfolio of patents covering numerous in-
ventions frequently license the entire patent portfolio at a single
royalty rate. For example, the owner of a large number of patents
covering different components and circuits in a color television set
might license the entire bundle of rights for 5% of the retail selling
price of the television set. This has the advantage of simplicity since
the licensor does not have to negotiate each license separately and
the licensee does not have to keep records to determine royalty pay-
ments for each patent. However, the arrangement is subject to the
charge that the licensor forced the licensee to accept a license un-
der some of the patents that were of little or no value in order to
get a license under the valuable patents. The argument runs that
if the licensee is using less than all of the patents in the portfolio
then he is entitled to a lower royalty. Also as the patents expire
the royalty rate should be decreased.
The courts have held that if the block license is for the con-
venience of the parties and especially if it were requested by the
licensee, such an arrangement does not necessarily run afoul of
antitrust law.69 However, if the court is persuaded that the li-
censor is using a superior bargaining position to coerce the licensee
into paying a royalty on the entire package, the court will consider
67. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
68. Id. at 494.
69. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
such an arrangement an antitrust violation.70 The distinction un-
fortunately places too much emphasis on motive. Any attorney
cognizant of the distinction will conduct license negotiations and
preliminary correspondence in a manner which lays a foundation
for the conclusion that the arrangement was for the benefit of the
parties and requested by the licensee.
6. Territorial Restrictions
The patent statute specifically provides for the right to "grant
and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or
patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States."'"
This has been interpreted to give the patentee the right to grant
one or more licenses each of which is territorially restricted to part
of the United States. The Antitrust Division of the Justice De-
partment responsible for patents, has taken the position that grant-
ing such licenses constitutes an illegal division of markets.7 2 How-
ever, in view of the clear language of the statute, they have not, in
litigating this issue, been able to persuade a court to agree. The
Justice Department's rationale is that a license grant in one terri-
tory implies a promise not to sell in all other territories. It is un-
doubtedly dangerous to include in a territorial license agreement a
covenant not to infringe the patent outside of the licensed terri-
tory. However, if the license contains no such convenant the li-
cense is probably legitimate as no litigated case has condemned
the practice. What the law is and what the Justice Department
would like it to be, at the moment are two different things.
7. Quantity Restrictions
Can the licensor limit the number of units made under a patent
license? The practice is dangerous, for if the licensor grants the
licensee a right to make one thousand units per year and extracts a
promise that he will not make more, antitrust activists take the
position that the licensor is using his patent to stifle competition. 73
Patent purists respond that since the patent owner did not have to
grant any license at all, granting a license to make one thousand
units per year increases competition. The rebuttal is that if no li-
cense at all were granted, the competitor might be motivated to
infringe the patent and test its validity in court. Granting a quan-
tity restrictive license gives the licensor control over competition
while escaping a court challenge of the patent's validity.
The safest course of action for the licensor, if such a restriction
is necessary, is to grant the license with no concomitant promise
70. Id. at 832.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1954) (emphasis added).
72. 161 U.S.P.Q. Vol. 11 (1968).
73. Id.
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not to make more than the specified number of units. If an action
were to be brought, testing the antitrust effect of such a license, the
court would probably look at the circumstances surrounding the
negotiation and the relative bargaining positions of the parties. If
the court concluded that there were an implicit agreement not to
make more than the stipulated number and the patentee was using
the patent license to limit competitive production, it would proba-
bly find a violation.
8. Field-of-Use Restrictions
The field-of-use restrictions in patent licenses are probably the
easiest to justify but are examined with the same degree of
suspicion as any other restriction. Field-of-use restriction in-
volves an invention capable of a multitude of uses. The patentee
may be interested in commercial exploitation only in one field.
Accordingly he may wish to license the patent in all other fields.
For example, assume a company manufacturing tape recorders de-
velops a fractional horsepower motor having a constant speed.
Such a device is highly desirable in tape recordings since fluctuation
in speed causes distortion. Also assume a company manufacturing
scientific instruments would have a need for the same motor. The
tape recorder manufacturer would not wish to go into the business
of manufacturing scientific instruments. Also he would not want to
grant an instrument maker an unrestricted patent license, since the
instrument maker might be tempted to make tape recorders. The
solution is a field-of-use restriction wherein the instrument maker
is granted a license to make, use, and sell devices covered by the
patent only for use in scientific instruments, reserving all other
fields for the patentee. The patentee might grant additional licenses
in other fields, for example process control equipment or adver-
tising displays. In each use, the licensee receives the right to use
the invention only in the specified field of use.
The field-of-use restriction is subject to all the infirmities of the
territorial restriction without the benefit of statutory sanction.
However, it has the advantage of being economically justifiable
over and above merely controlling competition. Since the licensees
are not competitors of the patent holder, there is less substance to
the charge of an anticompetitive effect. Again the patent holder
would be well advised not to insert a clause in the license agree-
ment whereby the licensee undertakes not to use the invention in




Determination of patent royalty is an inexact science. Where
the royalty rate is based on consumption or production of non-
patented items, the license again becomes suspect as a means for
using a patent to control nonpatented items. The same is true if
the payment of royalties exceeds the life of the patent. Payment
of royalties in the post expiration period has been held to be void
and the entire license tainted.7 5 Where the royalty rate on a ma-
chine is based on production as a handy formula for measuring the
benefit of the invention, the license may pass scrutiny, however,
the courts look with disfavor on such agreements.
The courts have not invalidated patent licenses on the basis
that the royalty rate is excessive, absent other anticompetitive con-
duct. The rationale seems to be that if two business firms reach a
royalty agreement in an arms length transaction, the court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the parties.7t Challengers of
this doctrine contend that excessive royalty is in effect a price-
fixing scheme since an abnormally high royalty will insure that




The grant-back restriction involves a situation where the li-
censor is concerned that the licensee will make an improvement
that will render obsolete the original invention and be itself pat-
entable; in effect, reversing the roles. To preclude this, the li-
censor may insert a clause in the license agreement whereby any
improvement inventions made by the licensee revert to the licensor.
This insures the licensor of continued control over the technology.
The criticism of such a clause is that it removes the incentive
for the licensee to try to advance the state of the art. The Su-
preme Court has refused to hold grant-backs illegal 9 on the
theory that as long as the licensor need not grant a license in the
first instance, there is no reason why he should be prohibited from
granting a license with grant-back restrictions. In fact, it would
be imprudent for him to do otherwise. The Justice Department
has taken the position and hopes to convince the courts that all the
licensor needs to protect himself, is the grant-back of a nonexclu-
sive, royalty free license under any improvement patents and that
75. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
76. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
77. See, e.g., American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 384 F.2d
813 (7th Cir. 1967).
78. Id. See also American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc.,
359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966) and 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (the
district court decision).
79. Transwrap Corp. v. Stokes Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
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the requirement to grant back exclusive rights to all improvements
is overreaching.80
11. Miscellaneous Restrictions
Obviously the categories listed above only include the classical
restrictions in patent licenses which have been reviewed by the
courts. The variety of restrictions and covenants insertable into a
patent license are limited only by the imagination of man. In each
case the courts will look to see if there is an anticompetitive effect.
If there is, they will then determine whether or not it is within
the scope of benefits intended by the patent laws. If not, the li-
censing practice will be considered an illegal extension of the pat-
ent.
III. REmES
A list of the various remedies available against monopolistic
patent activities from the least to the most severe, include:
A. Refusal of the courts to enforce the patent until the ef-
fects of the offensive conduct are purged. This remedy is usually
applied in situations where the culpability of the patent owner is of
a low level. Where the patent owner has discontinued the offen-
sive practice, the court will not punish the patent holder for previ-
ous conduct if the effect of the illegality has been dissipated and
the current defendant cannot show that he was damaged by the
existence of the illegality.61
B. Awarding attorney's fees. Ordinarily, attorney's fees are
not awarded unless the circumstances of the case are exceptional,
meaning exceptionally reprehensible. Courts have held that where
a patentee acquires a patent by fraud, and then brings suit on the
patent, a successful defense of fraud entitles the defendant to re-
cover attorney's fees.8 2
C. Compulsory license of the patent. The patentor is free to
license or not license his patent as he chooses. When the patent
has been used in a manner calculated to violate antitrust laws,
courts have taken the position that the only way of dispelling the
anticompetitive effect of the wrongful conduct is to make the pat-
80. Turner, Patents, Anti-trust and Innovation, 28 U. PITT. L. REV.
151, 153-60 (1966). Dr. Turner was the head of the Anti-trust Division
of the Justice Department at the time.
81. See, e.g., B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1941).
82. See, e.g., Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equip., Inc., 318
F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
ent available to all on a common basis. In such cases the courts have
required the patent owner to license anyone who requests a li-
cense on the basis of a reasonable royalty. 83 If the parties cannot
agree on what constitutes a reasonable royalty, the court will assist
them.
It is also possible that the court might compel the patent
holder to issue licenses on a royalty free basis. This is a more se-
vere penalty since it amounts to a dedication of the patent and
runs against the constitutional privilege against deprivation of
property without due process of the law. Nowhere in the patent or
antitrust statutes is such a remedy provided. However, the Gov-
ernment has been reasonably successful in getting such a provision
into consent decrees in antitrust cases.
D. Refusal to enforce the patent. This amounts to a corol-
lary of the clean hands doctrine. Where the patentee's conduct has
violated antitrust laws, the court may refuse to enforce the patent
against an infringer in spite of the fact that the patent is valid
and infringed.8 4 The remedy is frankly punitive and designed to
motivate the patentee not to abuse his monopoly position. It is
harsher than the remedy of refusing to enforce a contract involv-
ing a patent until the anticompetitive effect has been dissipated.
E. Treble damages. Both the Clayton Act and the Sherman
Act provide that an injured party may recover treble damages
against a violator of the antitrust laws. 5 The question of
whether a party who has wrongfully procured a patent and then
used it to perpetuate a monopoly is within the purview of the act,
was answered with a qualified yes.8 6 The qualification is that the
injured party must show that the other party, in fact, exercised
exclusionary power in the relevant market by the illegal patent.
8 7
F. Criminal sanctions. So far the courts have not enforced
criminal provisions for violation of antitrust laws by patent mis-
use.88 Probably because the types of cases arising in these fact
situations are judgment errors rather than culpable malfeasance.
Also with the appearance of bickering between business competi-
tors, juries are not moved to send people to jail for such offenses.
There is no reason however, why criminal sanctions might not be
applied in a heinous case.
83. See, e.g., Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
84. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1972).
85. See note 7 supra.
86. Walker, Inc. v. Food Machinery, 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
87. Id. at 177-78.
88. The exception was United States v. Union Camp Corp., Crimi-
nal Action No. 4558 (E.D. Va. 1967) wherein the Union Camp Corpora-
tion brought suit on a patent it knew to be invalid and its officers
and patent counsel suppressed evidence of invalidity.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The patent laws have existed by statute since 1790, based on a
constitutional mandate. The antitrust laws originated in the late
1800's and rely on a case by case development. Over the years
there have been occasional instances of friction between the two.
Lately the trend seems to be that patent laws have become sub-
servient to antitrust laws and that any conflict between the two
must, of necessity, result in the antitrust laws prevailing. The
laws and their respective philosophies are not in conflict of neces-
sity. Their aims are compatible, there is no innate reason why
they cannot peacefully coexist. Rather than treating them as in-
dependent concepts, the courts seem to feel that patent law repre-
sents an exception to the antitrust laws. Only when the courts re-
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